

PubPol 201
Module 3: International
Trade Policy

Class 4
China Shock

Class 4 Outline

China Shock

- China's growth
- The China Shock
- The ADH analysis
- Other sources

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
China's Growth

- Was China's growth expected?
 - Not by the Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1989
 - Expected growth leaders:
 - Bangladesh, Thailand, and Zimbabwe
 - Expected laggard: China
 - Due to "the stultifying bureaucracy of hard-line communism"

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GDP Growth Rates




Source: World Bank

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
GDP per capita (Constant 2000\$)





Source: World Bank

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China's Growth

- Why China's export growth accelerated after joining WTO in 2001
 - Not because others reduced tariffs on Chinese exports
 - They didn't
 - Instead they required China itself to lower tariffs and make other changes

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China's Growth

- Why China's export growth accelerated after joining WTO in 2001
 - Privatization of some former SOEs (state-owned enterprises) more them efficient.
 - Phased out restrictions that had inhibited exports.
 - Lower Chinese tariffs gave industries cheaper imported inputs, making them more productive.
 - Reduced uncertainty about foreign tariffs, unblocking investment.

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
China Shock

- Why study the China Shock?
 - It's important for its own sake
 - Many think it is the cause of the large decline in US manufacturing
 - But look at the data
 - That decline started long before the China Shock

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Figure 1: Manufacturing Share of U.S. Nonfarm Employment, 1939 - 2015



Source: FRED Economic Data <https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?g=1Gor>

China Shock

- Why study the China Shock?
 - Also, it's usually hard to find evidence of how trade affects an economy
 - Changes in trade are usually
 - Accompanied by many other changes
 - Caused in part by the economies you want to study
 - Thus causation is hard to figure out
 - But the China Shock was plausibly a "natural experiment"
 - A change in the real world similar to a controlled experiment

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China Shock

- Why study the China Shock?
 - The China Shock was plausibly a “natural experiment”
 - China's growth, and the growth of its trade, were unexpected
 - Its cause was largely the extreme isolation of China under Mao
 - Its comparative advantage was distinctive: much of manufacturing but not primary products or resources

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China Shock


- Why study the China Shock?
 - So the China Shock can give us information about how other changes in trade, including smaller ones, may affect an economy like the US

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Figure 3: The Evolution of China's Imports and Exports

A. Exports Minus Imports as a Share of GDP for China




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Figure 3: The Evolution of China's Imports and Exports

B. Revealed Comparative Advantage for China



Source: World Development Indicators.

"Revealed comparative advantage" uses a formula to try to infer a country's comparative advantage from data on its, and the world's, trade.

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China Shock


• Nature of the China Shock

- China's growth of exports to the US was broad
 - Covering most of manufacturing
 - Greatest in most labor-intensive sectors
 - Varied in size across products within an industry
- The variation suggests that effects will differ across localities in US, which specialize in different products
- So the natural experiment differs across localities, giving multiple observations to study

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Figure 4: Δ China-U.S. Net Import Penetration in Detailed Manufacturing Industry, 1991 - 2007



Discussion Question

The data show clearly that US imports from China rose at the same time that US manufacturing fell. Why is that, by itself, NOT enough to tell us that imports were harmful to the US?

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
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The ADH Analysis

- The data show
 - Simultaneous growth in
 - China's current account surplus
 - US's current account deficit

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The ADH Analysis

- The data show
 - Simultaneous growth in
 - China's current account surplus
 - US's current account deficit
 - That over the whole period 1991-2011, as well as sub-periods, across industries
 - Imports from China grew
 - Employment fell

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Table 2: Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment, 1991 - 2011

	1991-2011		1991-1999	1999-2011	1999-2007	2007-2011
	Mean	SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD
100 x Annual Δ U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports	0.50 (0.94)	0.14	0.27 (0.75)	0.66 (1.33)	0.84 (1.61)	0.30 (1.68)
100 x Annual Δ Emp. (Manufacturing industries)	-2.71 (3.07)	-2.05	-0.30 (3.49)	-4.32 (3.85)	-3.62 (4.15)	-5.73 (5.02)

Statistics are based on 392 4-digit manufacturing industries. The change in U.S. exposure to Chinese imports is computed by dividing 100 x the annualized increase in the value of U.S. imports over the indicated period by 1991 U.S. market volume in that industry. Employment changes are computed in the County Business Patterns. All observations are weighted by 1991 industry employment.

Δ = change
 Δ = change in the logarithm \approx percent change
 SD = standard deviation (measure of how different observations are)

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The ADH Analysis

- The data also show (from the standard deviations)
 - That there was considerable variation across industries in both import penetration and employment loss
 - This indicates that the data may reveal the relationship between them

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The ADH Analysis

- And they show that employment declined more in the later years:
 - 0.3 log points (\approx percentage) 1991-1999
 - 3.6 log points 1999-2007
 - 5.7 log point 2007-2011

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Table 2: Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment, 1991 - 2011

	1991-2011		1991-1999		1999-2011		1999-2007		2007-2011	
	Mean/SD	Median	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD
100 x Annual Δ in U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports	0.50 (0.94)	0.14	0.27 (0.75)	0.66 (1.33)	0.84 (1.61)	0.30 (1.68)				
100 x Annual Log Δ in Emp. (Manufacturing Industries)	-2.71 (3.07)	-2.05	-0.30 (3.59)	-4.32 (3.85)	-3.69 (4.19)	-5.75 (3.09)				


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The ADH Analysis

- Regression analysis
 - ADH used standard statistical techniques to estimate the relationship between the two variables.



The ADH Analysis

- Regression analysis
 - ADH used standard statistical techniques to estimate the relationship between the two variables.
 - Table 3 shows results for manufacturing only
 - Col 1: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares
 - Cols 2-3: 2SLS = Two-Stage Least Squares

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Table 3: Industry-Level Changes in Chinese Import Exposure and U.S. Manufacturing Employment, 1991 - 2011

Estimated change in employment associated with a 1-percentage point rise in import penetration

"Dummy variables" for time periods: ignore

	Stacked First Differences		
	1991-2011 (1)	1991-2007 (2)	1991-2007 (3)
100 x Annual Δ in U.S. Exposure to Chinese Imports	-0.81*** (0.16)	-1.30*** (0.41)	-1.24*** (0.37)
1{1991-1999}	-0.08 (0.36)	0.05 (0.36)	0.04 (0.36)
1{1999-2011}	-3.79*** (0.33)	-3.46*** (0.33)	
1{1999-2007}			-2.58*** (0.38)

Estimation Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS
 N = 784 (392 4-digit manufacturing industries x 2 periods 1991-1999 and 1999-2011 or 1999-2007). Employment changes are computed in the County Business Patterns and are expressed as 100 x annual log changes. Observations are weighted by 1991 employment. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 135 3-digit industries. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Three stars mean probability that true effect is zero is less than 1%.

Thus highly "statistically significant"

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The ADH Analysis

- Why 2SLS?
 - OLS results “could be biased because growth in import penetration is driven partly by domestic shocks.”
 - “Correlation is not causation”
 - 2SLS avoids this bias by using “instrumental variables”
 - Here these are import penetration from China in countries other than the US

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
The ADH Analysis

- Regression analysis
 - ADH used standard statistical techniques to estimate the relationship between the two variables.
 - Table 3 shows results for manufacturing only
 - Col 1: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares
 - Cols 2-3: 2SLS = Two-Stage Least Squares
 - These can be used to plot in maps how parts of the US have been affected

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Figure 6: Geographic Exposure to Trade Shocks at the Commuting Zone (CZ) Level




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Figure 6: Geographic Exposure to Trade Shocks at the Commuting Zone (CZ) Level

B. Quartiles of Exposure Conditional on Manufacturing Employment Share



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The ADH Analysis

- Effects on other things
 - Table 4A shows that import penetration causes
 - Fall in employment in non-manufacturing
 - Rise in unemployment
 - Rise in “not in labor force”
 - Table 4B show it also causes
 - Fall in population
 - Fall in wage
 - Rise in transfers (from government)

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Table 4: Import Competition and Outcomes in U.S. Local Labor Markets, 1990 - 2007

A. Δ Fraction of Working Age Population in Manufacturing, Unemployment, NILF			
Employed in Manufacturing (1)	Employed in Non-Manufacturing (2)	Unemployed (3)	Not in Labor Force (4)
-0.60*** (0.10)	-0.18 (0.14)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.55*** (0.15)
B. Δ Log Population, Log Wages, Annual Wage and Transfer Income			
Δ Log CZ Population (log pts) (5)	Δ Avg Log Weekly Wage (log pts) (6)	Δ Annual Wage/Salary Inc per Adult (US\$) (7)	Δ Transfers per Capita (US\$) (8)
-0.05 (0.75)	-0.76*** (0.25)	-549.3*** (169.4)	57.7*** (18.4)

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Discussion Question


Why would the China Shock cause each of these effects in localities with increased imports?

- Fall in employment in non-manufacturing
- Rise in unemployment
- Rise in “not in labor force”
- Fall in population
- Fall in wage
- Rise in transfers (from government)

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Figure 7: Imports from China and Induced Government Transfer Receipts in Commuting Zones, 1990 - 2007



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The ADH Analysis

- Persistence
 - Another finding of ADH (I won't show the graph) is that displaced workers tend either to remain in their same trade-impacted industry or move to another that is also vulnerable.
 - “Labor-market adjustment to trade shocks is stunningly slow”

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The ADH Analysis

- The China Shock: ADH Concluding Comments
 - “Employment has certainly fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition.”
 - “so too has overall employment in the local labor markets in which these industries were concentrated”
 - “Offsetting employment gains ... have, for the most part, failed to materialize.”
 - I question this, though, since US unemployment is so low
 - But: “The great China trade experiment may soon be over, if it is not already.”

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
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Other Sources

- Arnold, in a reading from NPR, says
 - “from 2000 to 2007, trade with China destroyed nearly 1 million U.S. manufacturing jobs.”
 - But the graph there shows jobs falling by about 6 million. So China trade was only a small part of the drop.
 - (Not really another source, since he's quoting David Autor, the A of ADH.)

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Other Sources

- Davis & Hilsenrath:
 - China was important even for jobs lost to Mexico: “Many U.S. factories that moved to Mexico did so to match prices from China.”
 - “If we encouraged China to trade, we needed domestic policies in place that would minimize the impact that would follow.” We didn’t have those.
 - Again not really a different source. This quotes Gordon Hanson, the H of ADH

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Other Sources

- Economist, “Economists Argue about the Impact of Chinese Imports on America”
 - Work by Rothwell criticizes the results of ADH
 - For using import data from Europe rather than the US
 - For the timing of the ADH data
 - For the way that the ADH results have been interpreted by the public, not recognizing that there were large consumer gains from the China Shock, as well as losses

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Other Sources

- Krugman
 - Argues that it has not been trade itself that caused the costs observed by ADH, but rather its rapid rate of change
 - This is relevant because a reversal of policy to reduce trade (by Trump?) would be equally damaging

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Discussion Question

What should the United States have done differently with regard to trade with China?

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